

## Message Text

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13

ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 DRC-01 /125 W

----- 048554

R 020842Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8035

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY CONAKRY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES

AMCONSUL LUANDA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 1389

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR NATO UN PO PU NO

SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU, NORWAY AND THE UN

REF: (A) LISBON 1152 (B) CONAKRY 457

1. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO TRY TO INFLUENCE NORWEGIAN VOTE BY THREATENING TO NEGATE IT WITH OUR VETO, AS DANISH AMBASSADOR TSCHERNING IS IN EFFECT SUGGESTING.

2. NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT DECISIONS ON UN VOTES ARE TAKEN AFTER A COMPLEX JUGGLING OF PRIORITIES AMONG SEVERAL, OFTEN CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES:

A. STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS;

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B. RETAINING CLOSE BILATERAL TIES WITH THE US;

C. MAINTAINING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR NATO;

D. CHOOSING THE "RIGHT" AND "MORAL" SOLUTION; AND

E. SURVIVING POLITICALLY IN A DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT  
WHERE LEFTIST FORCES ARE GAINING STRENGTH.

3. MANY NORWEGIAN POLICY MAKERS ARE IDEALISTIC AND SOMETIMES NAIVE, AND THEY IDENTIFY WITH THE UNDERDOG; WE SUSPECT THAT OBJECTIVE (D) SHAPES THEIR DECISION MORE OFTEN THAN A HARD-HEADED AWARENESS OF POLITICAL REALITIES IN THE WORLD WOULD WARRANT. WHEN THIS MEANS PARTING COMPANY WITH THE US ON UN VOTES, AS IT OFTEN DOES, IT IS RATIONALIZED IN TERMS OF OBJECTIVES (C) AND (E). ONLY IF OBJECTIVE (B)--GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US--WERE SERIOUSLY AT STAKE WOULD THEY BE CONCERNED THAT THEIR VOTE DIFFERS FROM OURS. THE FACT THAT THEY ARE VOTING ON THE LOSING SIDE, EITHER BECAUSE THE MAJORITY IS AGAINST THEM OR--AS SUGGESTED BY TSCHERNING--BECAUSE THE MAJORITY DECISION MIGHT BE VETOED, RARELY SEEMS TO DISTURB THEM. THEIR SMALL-COUNTRY COMPLEX, AT THE SAME TIME, MAKES THEM PARTICULARLY RESISTANT TO ANYTHING THEY PERCEIVE AS THREATS OR PRESSURE.

4. WE MIGHT WIN NORWAY'S VOTE IN A GIVEN CASE BY THREATENING A DETERIORATION IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT WE CAN DO SO ONLY RARELY AND ONLY IF WE MEAN IT. OTHERWISE, OUR BEST HOPE OF INFLUENCING THE NORWEGIAN VOTE ON AFRICAN/PORTUGUESE ISSUES IS TO PROVIDE CONVINCING ARGUMENTATION ON THE LEGAL SITUATION, ON THE EFFECT ON THE UN OF CONTINUING TO TAKE ACTIONS IN DISREGARD OF THAT SITUATION, AND ON THE EXTENT OF THE RISK THAT ANTI-PORTUGUESE ACTIONS BY NATO ALLIES WILL JEOPARDIZE THE AZORES FACILITIES AND CONSEQUENTLY HARM NORWEGIAN REPEAT NORWEGIAN SECURITY INTERESTS. POINTING OUT TO THEM THAT THEIR VOTE WON'T COUNT, HOWEVER DIPLOMATICALLY PUT, IS MOST LIKELY TO STIFFEN THEIR BACKS IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.

5. FOREGOING IS LIMITED TO TSCHERNING'S SUGGESTION THAT WE MAKE KNOWN OUR INTENTIONS IN ADVANCE, IF WE INTEND TO  
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VETO, AND IS NOT MEANT TO BE A COMMENT ON MERITS OF ISSUE. GIVEN WIDESPREAD NORWEGIAN INTEREST IN AND SUPPORT FOR ACCELERATED DECOLONIZATION--BY NO MEANS LIMITED TO LABOR PARTY AND FAR LEFT--STRONGER US SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS WOULD BE WARMLY APPLAUDED IN NORWAY. ON THE OTHER HAND, A PREMATURE DECLARATION OF OUR INTENT TO VETO GUINEA-BISSAU ADMISSION, IF THAT SHOULD BE OUR DECISION, WOULD AS SUGGESTED BY EMBASSY CONAKRY PROVIDE BASIS FOR ANTI-US PROPAGANDA. WE REALIZE US POSITION MUST ULTIMATELY BE DECIDED ON BASIS OF OUR OWN WEIGHING OF GLOBAL PRIORITIES, INCLUDING AZORES

FACILITIES. BYRNE

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## Message Attributes

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